In Western public discourse and the media, there’s a phrase that’s become widely accepted: the war in Ukraine is “an unprovoked war of aggression.” The war is said to be the result of the imperialist ambitions of a Russian leader who is seeking to restore Tsarist-era grandeur. Anyone who challenges this narrative is suspected of spreading “Russian propaganda.”
This interpretation has the advantage of simplicity. It draws a clear distinction between aggressors and victims, identifies a culprit, and defines one side as good and the other as evil. At the same time, it polarizes the interpretation and excludes other perspectives that, as it turns out, are well-founded and cannot simply be dismissed as “Russian propaganda”—as we shall see.
This is by no means an attempt to justify war. This article is intended first and foremost as a call for peace. It aims to show that a simplistic view fails to do justice to the complexity of reality and hinders our understanding of war—and thereby its end. Foremost is the suffering of the people who are helplessly exposed to the atrocities of war: men, women, children, and torn families who are going through hell every day in Ukraine. Along with them, we also think of the victims of other devastating war zones, especially in the Middle East.
One-sided blame does not do justice to the complexity of a conflict—as we learn from our personal lives—and becomes a surefire way to further fuel the escalation of violence. History shows that oversimplified interpretations of responsibility—as at the end of World War I—can have catastrophic consequences. Conflict resolution requires self-reflection. “First remove the plank from your own eye, and then you will see clearly to remove the speck from your brother’s eye” (Matt. 7:5). This is not about moralizing, but about the practice of insight: “Then you will see clearly.”
The Security Dilemma
In international relations, there is a classic theoretical framework: the “security dilemma,” which John Herz first formulated in 1950 and which is still studied today. This theory emerged from an analysis of World War I. If State A strengthens its security, State B perceives this as a threat and, in turn, builds up its own military capacities. This, in turn, confirms State A’s assessment that State B presents a threat. This creates a spiral that can lead to war without either party having intended it. Conclusion: A state must not only focus on its own security system, but also on how others perceive its military buildup.
Following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Stephen Walt, a professor at Harvard University, pointed to this fundamental principle of the security dilemma. In Foreign Policy, he wrote, “NATO officials might regard Russia’s fears as fanciful or as ‘myths,’ but that hardly means that they are completely absurd or that Russians don’t genuinely believe them.” He continues, “The fear that Ukraine was slipping rapidly into the Western orbit heightened Russian fears and led Putin to launch an illegal, costly, and now protracted preventive war.”1
This analysis shows how responsibilities are intertwined. The issue is not who is morally right or wrong, but rather how important it is to take the other person’s perspective into account. This is what realism calls for. A threat perceived as existential—whether justified or not—leads to potentially dangerous counter-reactions. Peace can only be actively achieved by taking into account the perspective, interests, fears, and concerns of the conversation partner.
Early Warning Signs and a Deaf Ear
As early as 1993, long before Putin became head of state, the U.S. was aware that the issue of NATO expansion was of crucial importance to Russia. On September 15, 1993, Boris Yeltsin wrote in a letter to Bill Clinton that “the spirit of the treaty [. . .] precludes the option of expanding the NATO zone into the East.”2 Although it is not written in the treaty, the Russians’ concern was already palpable at that time. The following month, James Collins, Chargé d’Affaires in Moscow, confirmed in an internal telegram to Bill Clinton that the NATO issue is “a neuralgic to the Russians” and that “no matter how nuanced, if NATO adopts a policy which envisions expansion into Central and Eastern Europe without holding the door open to Russia, it would be universally interpreted in Moscow as directed against Russia and Russia alone.”3
This sense of danger persisted in Russian-American diplomacy. In 1997, George Kennan, one of the most influential American strategists of the twentieth century, described NATO’s expansion plans as “the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.”4 He predicted that such a decision would “inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western, and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion” and would “restore the atmosphere of the cold war.” Everything that happened afterward corresponded almost word for word to his prediction.
In February 2008, William Burns, then U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, warned in a cable later published by WikiLeaks against NATO’s expansion to include Ukraine. For Russia, it remains an “emotional and neuralgic issue”; at the same time, it threatens to divide Ukraine, trigger violence—even civil war—and push Russia toward intervention.5 Two months later, the NATO summit in Bucharest ignored this warning and declared that Ukraine and Georgia should become NATO members.
On March 5, 2014, shortly after the Maidan protests and the annexation of Crimea, Henry Kissinger warned in The Washington Post that he condemned the annexation but that “Ukraine should not join NATO” and must remain a bridge between East and West.6 He was, however, ignored. In December 2021, Russia called for talks and a halt to further NATO expansion. On January 26, 2022, NATO and the U.S. rejected these demands, citing Ukrainian sovereignty; a few weeks later, the offensive began.
In the context of the security dilemma, these examples show that the U.S. and NATO were unwilling to take into account the threat perceived by Russia in their decision-making. Of course, Russia bears responsibility for its military actions and their consequences. However, by disregarding this—whether due to missteps or a deliberate strategy—the U.S. and NATO share responsibility for the situation.
Mistakes or Strategies?
The American economist Jeffrey Sachs, a former special advisor to several UN secretaries-general, took it a step further. In a speech before the European Parliament on February 19, 2025, he interpreted the conflict as a strategy, not merely a misstep.7 He situated it historically where Lord Palmerston, British Prime Minister in 1855, advocated containing Russia on the Black Sea during the Crimean War. This approach, he argued, was continued in Halford Mackinder’s “Heartland” theory: “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island.” For maritime powers—above all Great Britain and the United States—this implies a need to prevent a Russian-Central European rapprochement. Sachs also cited Zbigniew Brzeziński as a proponent of this view, in which Ukraine appears as a geopolitical hub.8
In 2015, George Friedman, chairman of Stratfor and founder of Geopolitical Futures, made a statement based on this theory: “The primary interest of the United States over which we have fought wars for a century—the First, Second, and Cold War—has always been the relationship between Germany and Russia. because united they are the only force that could threaten us and it was necessary to ensure that this doesn’t happen.”9 Friedman not only outlined a sober strategy, but also hinted at a deep-seated U.S. fear: an alliance between Germany and Russia is “the only combination that has for centuries scared the hell out of the United States.”
While these are merely perspectives, they come from American geopolitical experts. Mary Elise Sarotte, who has analyzed the archives of U.S. diplomacy, sees a lack of direction rather than a coherent strategy. Sachs, on the other hand, emphasizes that these strategic patterns remain clearly discernible despite changes in administration. One thing is certain: decisions in Washington arise from internal power struggles and competing viewpoints. Simplifications therefore fall short. Good intentions can coexist with bumbling, imperialism, mistakes, and dangerous strategies.
There are imperialist forces on the Russian side as well. They, too, should not be cited as the sole cause. While the United States understands itself as the chosen guardian of freedom in the world, Russia has for centuries been shaped by conceptions that it is the chosen people, called upon to establish the future Christian city—sometimes referred to as the “Third Rome.” This idea of a Russian “mission” can be interpreted spiritually, but it can also fuel imperialism, nationalism, or the wish for great-power status. Here, too, as in the U.S., good intentions, strategic visions, imperialist ambitions, fears, and miscalculations are intertwined.
Continued Refusal to Engage in Dialogue
Ultimately, the EU also bears co-responsibility for these developments. Since 2007, it had been negotiating a trade agreement (DCFTA) with Ukraine, which was scheduled to be signed in Vilnius at the end of November 2013. At the same time, Ukraine was bound by agreements with Russia (including the CIS Free Trade Area and the Naftogaz-Gazprom contract), which were difficult to reconcile with the DCFTA. Russia therefore repeatedly called for trilateral talks, but the EU rejected them, citing Ukrainian sovereignty. The exclusion of Russian concerns contributed to a trade war and left Ukraine caught in the crossfire between the power blocs.
On November 21, 2013, the Yanukovych government halted preparations for the signing and once again proposed trilateral negotiations to clarify the trade implications of the agreement. Brussels rejected the proposal once again. The Maidan protests began that very night. The proposal was rejected again at the summit in Vilnius. Yanukovych fled to Russia in February 2014. Crimea was annexed in March. In the spring, war broke out in the Donbas. The scenario outlined in William Burns’s telegram became reality.
This helps us understand why Jeffrey Sachs said in his speech to the European Parliament in 2025, “You’re going to be living with Russia for a long time, so please negotiate with Russia. There are real security issues on the table both for Europe and Russia, but the bombast and the Russophobia is not serving your security at all. It’s not serving Ukraine’s security at all.”10
Prosperity and the Geniuses of Cultures
In this speech to the European Parliament, Sachs outlined his vision for the future: “So, if we put our minds, our resources and our energies towards it, we can transform the world energy system for climate safety. We can protect biodiversity. We can ensure every child gets a quality education.” What do we need to achieve this? Peace. For Sachs, every war is based on a fallacy: “We are not struggling for Lebensraum [living space]. That idea, which essentially came from Malthus and later became a Nazi idea, was always wrong, a fundamental intellectual mistake. We have had race wars, national wars of survival, out of the fear that we don’t have enough for everybody on this planet, so that we are in a struggle for survival. As an economist, I can tell you, we have plenty on the planet for everybody’s sustainable development. Plenty.”
In this way, he comes near to Rudolf Steiner, who, in a 1905 lecture on the causes of war, pointed to the same problem. As long as we cling to concepts that say the struggle for survival and competition are the driving forces of evolution, we will continue to produce wars.11 Steiner referred to the Russian zoologist Karl Fyodorovich Kessler, for whom it is not the “struggle for existence” but “mutual aid” that is the lever of evolution. It is perhaps no coincidence that Kessler, the prophet of this new concept, conducted his research in Ukraine, along the Dnieper River and on the shores of the Azov and Black Seas.
War destroys and impoverishes. Mutual aid and fellowship can foster a thriving economy and allow human genius to unfold in cultural diversity. Every culture possesses its own genius, which, however, becomes veiled as soon as confrontation and war take hold. Where the struggle for survival and competition dominate, shadows and doppelgängers emerge: the sharp teeth and predatory glances of the U.S., Russia, Europe, China, etc. Every political space carries a degree of selfishness within it. Mutual aid and care help to overcome this and help us to get to know how the geniuses of peoples and cultures interact. Their wealth grows the more they perceive and enrich one another.
This is the tragedy of our time. While humanity should be mature enough by now to recognize and appreciate the diversity of cultural genius, we are witnessing a resurgence of nationalism and imperialism that allows us to see only our own egoistic reflections.
Anthroposophy as Multiperspectivism
Breaking free from nationalism and imperialism means changing one’s own perspective. The other is then no longer a rival or a threat, but rather a spiritual discovery and a shared treasure. This involves stepping outside of oneself, examining one’s own standards, and refraining from imposing one’s own concepts on other cultures. It requires a multiperspectival path to understanding.
Multiperspectivism is a fundamental strength of anthroposophy. It views the world simultaneously from various angles—spiritual and material, idealistic and realistic, Western and Eastern. Such a multifaceted approach is integral to holistic understanding. Each perspective is like a musical note in a larger composition that does justice to the complexity of reality. Steiner describes this in his unfinished book, Anthroposophy-A Fragment, and in other works. He illustrates the human process of cognition using the image of a tree. Every view, whether painted or photographed, depicts a tree “from a specific point of view and in full truth, too. If one chooses a different point of view, the image becomes quite different. And only a series of images, taken from the most diverse viewpoints, can, through their interaction, provide an overall representation of the tree.” This applies to all things and all beings in the world. What a person can say about them must be formulated as “views” that “hold true from different viewpoints”—in the sensory as well as in the spiritual.12
The multiperspectival approach calls for refraining from hasty judgments and broadening our perspectives. Pacifism begins in the mind. Every person is, in and of themselves, a unique perspective. Thus, interest in another’s point of view becomes an inward attitude. Interest in other cultures can overcome nationalism and imperialism, for “What is more quickening than light? Conversation!”13 The crucial question is how, in a world defined by acceleration and efficiency, can we create spaces for deceleration and multiperspectivism?
Translation Joshua Kelberman
Title image Robert Delaunay, Rythmes, 1934, oil on canvas, Musée national d’Art moderne, Centre Pompidou, Paris.
Footnotes
- Stephen M. Walt, “Does Anyone Still Understand the ‘Security Dilemma’?” Foreign Policy (July 26, 2022).
- Boris Yeltsin, “Retranslation of Yeltsin Letter on NATO Expansion,” September 15, 1993, U.S. Department of State, case no. M-2006-01499, in National Security Archive.
- James F. Collins, “Your October 21–23 Visit to Moscow – Key Foreign Policy Issues,” briefing memorandum to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, October 1993, in “NATO Expansion: What Yeltsin Heard,” National Security Archive Briefing Book no. 621, document 6 (March 16, 2018), p. 4.
- George F. Kennan, “A Fateful Error,” New York Times (February 5, 1997).
- William J. Burns, “Nyet Means Nyet: Russia’s NATO Enlargement Redlines,” diplomatic cable no. 08MOSCOW265_a, U.S. Embassy Moscow to Joint Chiefs of Staff, NATO-EU Cooperative, National Security Council, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State, February 1, 2008, published by WikiLeaks.
- Henry A. Kissinger, “How the Ukraine Crisis Ends,” The Washington Post (March 5, 2014).
- Jeffrey D. Sachs, “The Geopolitics of Peace,” speech at the European Parliament (event hosted by Michael von der Schulenburg, MEP), Brussels, February 19, 2025, YouTube video, 1:34:52; transcript published February 28, 2025, by Brave New Europe.
- Zbigniew Brzeziński, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997).
- George Friedman, “Europe: Destined for Conflict?” lecture at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs,” February 4, 2015, YouTube video, 53:21, 1:10:33.
- See footnote 7.
- Rudolf Steiner, Die Welträtsel und die Anthroposophie [The world riddles and anthroposophy], GA 54 (Dornach: Rudolf Steiner Verlag, 1983), “Unsere Weltlage. Krieg, Frieden und die Wissenschaft des Geistes” [The state of the world: War, peace, and the science of the spirit], lecture in Berlin, Oct. 12, 1905.
- Rudolf Steiner, Anthroposophy (A Fragment): A New Foundation for the Study of Human Nature (Hudson, NY: Anthroposophic Press, 1966), ch. 1, “The Character of Anthroposophy.”
- Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, The Fairy Tale of the Green Snake and the Beautiful Lily (Wynstones Press, 2007); first published in 1795 as “Das Märchen” [The fairy tale].
